Wiew here what is and the list of contents.
About this commission
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was established by Executive Order 13328, which was signed by the President on February 6, 2004. The Commission is charged with assessing whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks). In doing so, the Commission shall examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of such foreign powers relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century. The Commission will report its findings and recommendations to the President by March 31, 2005.
Executive Order [PDF] White House Fact Sheet [PDF] President's Statement [PDF]
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
Transmittal Letter [PDF]
Overview of the Report [PDF]
-Part One: Looking Back [PDF]
Chapter One Case Study: Iraq [PDF]
Chapter Two Case Study: Libya [PDF]
Chapter Three Case Study: Al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan [PDF]
Chapter Four: Terrorism: Managing Today’s Threat [PDF]
Chapter Five: Iran and North Korea: Monitoring the Development of Nuclear Weapons [PDF]
Part Two: Looking Forward [PDF]
Chapter Six: Leadership and Management: Forging an Integrated Intelligence Community [PDF]
Chapter Seven: Collection [PDF]
Chapter Eight: Analysis [PDF]
Chapter Nine: Information Sharing [PDF]
Chapter Ten: Intelligence at Home: The FBI, Justice, and Homeland Security [PDF]
Chapter Eleven: Counterintelligence [PDF]
Chapter Twelve: Covert Action [PDF]
Chapter Thirteen: The Changing Proliferation Threat and the Intelligence Response [PDF]
Conclusion [PDF]
Postscript: Additional Intelligence Challenges [PDF]
Appendix A: Authorizing Executive Order [PDF]
Appendix B: List of Findings and Recommendations [PDF]
Appendix C: An Intelligence Community Primer [PDF]
Appendix D: Common Abbreviations [PDF]
Appendix E: Biographical Information for Commissioners and List of Commission Staff [PDF]
Contact WMD at: comments@wmd.gov
Contact page edior at: europeanexpress@gmail.com
Sunday, July 02, 2006
Saturday, June 17, 2006
Model Integrated Relief Policy Workshop Held in Belize
A workshop to consider the Model Integrated Relief Policy for the Caribbean and its implications for Belize was recently completed at the headquarters of the National Emergency Management Organization in Belmopan.
The Model Integrated Relief Policy is a document that seeks to bring cohesion to disaster response and relief coordination in the Caribbean. The effort is being spearheaded by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), with funding assistance from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
The document cites some of the shortfalls and inefficiencies that occurred during the intense 2004 hurricane season. By citing these instances, the document aims to create a policy that will enhance the regional relief response mechanism of the Caribbean. An improvement of the regional relief response mechanism will result in the alleviation of human suffering following destructive events such as a hurricane.
Belizean public officers and disaster managers familiar with the challenges of relief supplies delivery and management participated in the workshop. Working in groups, each participant shared their personal experiences of the pitfalls associated with relief management. At the end of the workshop, they had begun to hammer out what is to become Belize’s contribution to the Model Integrated Relief Policy for the Caribbean.
This workshop, in Belize, is one of many that are being held in all of CDERA ‘s 16 participating states throughout the Caribbean. The workshops draw on the expertise of facilitators from the region who have working experiences of disaster situations and who understand CDERA’s regional disaster management principles and policies. The workshop's facilitator was Mr. Sylvan McIntyre.
Information provided by: Belize National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO)
The Model Integrated Relief Policy is a document that seeks to bring cohesion to disaster response and relief coordination in the Caribbean. The effort is being spearheaded by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), with funding assistance from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
The document cites some of the shortfalls and inefficiencies that occurred during the intense 2004 hurricane season. By citing these instances, the document aims to create a policy that will enhance the regional relief response mechanism of the Caribbean. An improvement of the regional relief response mechanism will result in the alleviation of human suffering following destructive events such as a hurricane.
Belizean public officers and disaster managers familiar with the challenges of relief supplies delivery and management participated in the workshop. Working in groups, each participant shared their personal experiences of the pitfalls associated with relief management. At the end of the workshop, they had begun to hammer out what is to become Belize’s contribution to the Model Integrated Relief Policy for the Caribbean.
This workshop, in Belize, is one of many that are being held in all of CDERA ‘s 16 participating states throughout the Caribbean. The workshops draw on the expertise of facilitators from the region who have working experiences of disaster situations and who understand CDERA’s regional disaster management principles and policies. The workshop's facilitator was Mr. Sylvan McIntyre.
Information provided by: Belize National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO)
Monday, June 05, 2006
Asian Development Bank Coordinating with Partners on Indonesia Earthquake Relief Assistance
ADB is working closely with the Government of Indonesia and other development partners, including the World Bank, United Nations, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation, on assessing the most effective ways to assist people affected by the 27 May earthquake.
ADB has initially offered US$10 million in immediate grant assistance and $50 million in concessional loans, for a total of $60 million, to help meet the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs.
“ADB has a wealth of experience in implementing projects in disaster affected areas,” said Rajat Nag, Director General of ADB’s Southeast Asia Department, who visited central Java and Yogyakarta two days after the earthquake. “We will continue to assess the needs in the area and are already exploring how we can support the Government of Indonesia in the medium term.”
ADB has put together an immediate response team, comprising experts from various sectors, and will take part in a joint Government-donor mission to the affected areas on 6-7 June 2006.
The Government of Indonesia, through the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), will lead the damage and loss assessment process. The Indonesia government has convened a series of meetings since the earthquake, and the joint Government-donor teams are setting priorities and dividing responsibilities for assistance beyond the initial rescue and relief efforts, such as ensuring adequate provision of housing and utilities.
ADB has long experience in several sectors in the affected areas, including roads, flood management systems, and hospitals. ADB has an ongoing road rehabilitation project in the area, for example, as well as a project to provide housing and community infrastructure support.
-Asian Development Bank-
ADB has initially offered US$10 million in immediate grant assistance and $50 million in concessional loans, for a total of $60 million, to help meet the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs.
“ADB has a wealth of experience in implementing projects in disaster affected areas,” said Rajat Nag, Director General of ADB’s Southeast Asia Department, who visited central Java and Yogyakarta two days after the earthquake. “We will continue to assess the needs in the area and are already exploring how we can support the Government of Indonesia in the medium term.”
ADB has put together an immediate response team, comprising experts from various sectors, and will take part in a joint Government-donor mission to the affected areas on 6-7 June 2006.
The Government of Indonesia, through the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), will lead the damage and loss assessment process. The Indonesia government has convened a series of meetings since the earthquake, and the joint Government-donor teams are setting priorities and dividing responsibilities for assistance beyond the initial rescue and relief efforts, such as ensuring adequate provision of housing and utilities.
ADB has long experience in several sectors in the affected areas, including roads, flood management systems, and hospitals. ADB has an ongoing road rehabilitation project in the area, for example, as well as a project to provide housing and community infrastructure support.
-Asian Development Bank-
Sunday, May 28, 2006
Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction
Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction are critical to the World Bank's mission of poverty reduction. Many of the world's poorest countries are locked in a tragic vicious circle where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty. Eighty percent of the world's 20 poorest countries have suffered a major war in the past 15 years. On average, countries coming out of war face a 44 percent chance of relapsing in the first five years of peace. Even with rapid progress after peace, it can take a generation or more just to return to pre-war living standards.
Through assessment of the causes, consequences and characteristics of conflict and the transfer of lessons learned, the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit works to design development efforts specific to conflict-affected countries. The Post-Conflict Fund provides financing for physical and social reconstruction initiatives in post-war societies. The Bank is playing a significant role in Afghanistan, Africa's Great Lakes region, the Balkans, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, the West Bank and Gaza, and other war-torn areas.
Jun 20, 2005 Growing on the Ashes of Conflict
Jun 20, 2005 Emerger de las cenizas del conflicto
May 26, 2005 Remarks on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
Through assessment of the causes, consequences and characteristics of conflict and the transfer of lessons learned, the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit works to design development efforts specific to conflict-affected countries. The Post-Conflict Fund provides financing for physical and social reconstruction initiatives in post-war societies. The Bank is playing a significant role in Afghanistan, Africa's Great Lakes region, the Balkans, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, the West Bank and Gaza, and other war-torn areas.
More NEWS at WorldBank.org
Jun 20, 2005 Growing on the Ashes of Conflict
Jun 20, 2005 Emerger de las cenizas del conflicto
May 26, 2005 Remarks on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
The Nation: Terrorists' Talk
The nation was on high alert last week because of what officials and security experts said was a surge in intercepted communications -- "chatter" -- among suspected Qaeda operatives.
Although officials said the intercepts indicated that terrorists might have moved closer to an attack, there was still not enough detail on who, when and where. This is frustrating as well as terrifying. But once you understand the technology, it is clear why they call it "chatter" and why it is so hard to make sense of. Twenty or so years ago, most telecommunications were messages between two parties at fixed points connected by a single, continuous link. The link could be either wire or radio. To listen in, you simply tapped it somewhere along its length.
If the link was inside the United States, law enforcement officials could tap it with a court order and the cooperation of the phone company. If the link was outside, the task was usually harder. In the 1970's the Navy sent submarines to the Sea of Okhotsk to tap cables linking Soviet bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk to Moscow. But once the tap was there, reading the traffic was straightforward.
Today, a direct tap is often impossible. Digital messages, via cellphone or Internet, can follow any number of paths from Point A to Point B. So, to have any chance of detecting a message -- let alone intercepting it -- the tap must be as close as possible to the sender or the receiver. Often that means recruiting a spy who can break into a telephone, a computer or an Internet router. (The K.G.B. used this strategy in 1986, when it bugged electric typewriters in the American embassy in Moscow; the machines transmitted what was being typed via their power cords to the outside.)
Recent legal changes permit United States officials to monitor individuals rather than specific phones. But terrorists already have a good idea of how American intelligence is trying to track them. That's why many discard their mobile phones every week or so to confound anyone trying to trace them. Or they log on at Internet cafes using e-mail accounts they change with similar frequency.
The volume of messages has grown exponentially, too. And modern digital messages are inherently easier to encrypt. Widely available commercial encryption software is often as good as what governments use.
Even if messages are intercepted and deciphered, the contents can be opaque. In the old days, an intelligence analyst could listen to a target for days, weeks or even months. After a while, he would know the cast of characters and perhaps even recognize their voices and jargon.
With digital, mobile communications, intercepting a terrorist communication is like trying to eavesdrop on a particular conversation in a crowded restaurant. Which table? Which conversation? And just what are they talking about? Imagine listening in on this conversation. Before the Sept. 11 attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the planner of the strike, reportedly told Al Jazeera television that he had received a phone call from Mohamed Atta, the leader of the hijackers. Mr. Atta told him, "Two sticks, a dash and a cake with a stick down" -- a code for 9-11 -- indicating he was executing the plan, and when. Now imagine if all of this coded talk is in a foreign language. That's what it's like trying to make sense of chatter.
Technology can be used to automate eavesdropping; computers can listen for certain words or phrases in certain languages. But anyone who has tried to use an automated telephone system knows how hit-or-miss machine voice recognition can be. For now, intelligence analysis must rely on old-fashioned human ears. Given the challenges, it's something of a miracle we can collect useful signals at all.
The New York Times (Feb.13-2003)
Although officials said the intercepts indicated that terrorists might have moved closer to an attack, there was still not enough detail on who, when and where. This is frustrating as well as terrifying. But once you understand the technology, it is clear why they call it "chatter" and why it is so hard to make sense of. Twenty or so years ago, most telecommunications were messages between two parties at fixed points connected by a single, continuous link. The link could be either wire or radio. To listen in, you simply tapped it somewhere along its length.
If the link was inside the United States, law enforcement officials could tap it with a court order and the cooperation of the phone company. If the link was outside, the task was usually harder. In the 1970's the Navy sent submarines to the Sea of Okhotsk to tap cables linking Soviet bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk to Moscow. But once the tap was there, reading the traffic was straightforward.
Today, a direct tap is often impossible. Digital messages, via cellphone or Internet, can follow any number of paths from Point A to Point B. So, to have any chance of detecting a message -- let alone intercepting it -- the tap must be as close as possible to the sender or the receiver. Often that means recruiting a spy who can break into a telephone, a computer or an Internet router. (The K.G.B. used this strategy in 1986, when it bugged electric typewriters in the American embassy in Moscow; the machines transmitted what was being typed via their power cords to the outside.)
Recent legal changes permit United States officials to monitor individuals rather than specific phones. But terrorists already have a good idea of how American intelligence is trying to track them. That's why many discard their mobile phones every week or so to confound anyone trying to trace them. Or they log on at Internet cafes using e-mail accounts they change with similar frequency.
The volume of messages has grown exponentially, too. And modern digital messages are inherently easier to encrypt. Widely available commercial encryption software is often as good as what governments use.
Even if messages are intercepted and deciphered, the contents can be opaque. In the old days, an intelligence analyst could listen to a target for days, weeks or even months. After a while, he would know the cast of characters and perhaps even recognize their voices and jargon.
With digital, mobile communications, intercepting a terrorist communication is like trying to eavesdrop on a particular conversation in a crowded restaurant. Which table? Which conversation? And just what are they talking about? Imagine listening in on this conversation. Before the Sept. 11 attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the planner of the strike, reportedly told Al Jazeera television that he had received a phone call from Mohamed Atta, the leader of the hijackers. Mr. Atta told him, "Two sticks, a dash and a cake with a stick down" -- a code for 9-11 -- indicating he was executing the plan, and when. Now imagine if all of this coded talk is in a foreign language. That's what it's like trying to make sense of chatter.
Technology can be used to automate eavesdropping; computers can listen for certain words or phrases in certain languages. But anyone who has tried to use an automated telephone system knows how hit-or-miss machine voice recognition can be. For now, intelligence analysis must rely on old-fashioned human ears. Given the challenges, it's something of a miracle we can collect useful signals at all.
The New York Times (Feb.13-2003)
Global Economy: Iraqi Oil
If Saddam Hussein is ousted as leader of Iraq, the United States will face critical decisions about the future of the world's second-largest oil reserves. Should the United States support greatly increased Iraqi oil production? Or should America protect the status quo of artificially high oil prices?
The choice the United States makes will have profound repercussions far into the future, because Iraq holds 112 billion barrels of proven reserves of crude oil -- more than five times the size of U.S. reserves.
For decades, the United States has appeared satisfied with the status quo of high oil prices more than $20 per barrel in today's dollars, rather than prices in the $8 to $12 per barrel range, which is where they would be today under a free market. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries drives oil prices artificially high by keeping the supply of oil artificially low.
U.N. sanctions against Iraq are a key factor in holding down worldwide oil production and keeping oil prices high. Because of the sanctions, Iraq produces fewer than 2.5 million barrels of oil a day -- far below what that country's huge oil resource base can sustain.
If Iraq is defeated in a war with the United States and allied nations, Iraq will need funds to rebuild. Oil exports are the obvious answer. Within 5 to 10 years, a combination of high pay-off investment and sound management could enable Iraq's oil fields to produce more than 10 million barrels of oil per day -- more than four times the current level.
Pumping millions of additional barrels of oil into the world market everyday would cause world oil prices to plummet. It is very unlikely that key OPEC members would agree to cut their own oil income by accepting significant cuts in their production. OPEC could plunge into a death spiral.
Under a free market, oil prices would probably fall to between $8 and $12 per barrel over the next 10 years -- down dramatically from today's price of about $25 per barrel. At current prices, the United States is sending about $90 billion per year to OPEC members and other oil exporting countries. Globally, about $350 billion per year moves from oil importers to oil exporters. With free-market oil prices, these huge transfers of wealth would drop by at least half and possibly as much as two-thirds.
A major decrease in petroleum prices would boost U.S. and global economic activity. Home heating oil prices would drop by at least a third. Gasoline prices would drop to less than $1 a gallon. As a result, people and business in the United States and throughout the world would spend far less for fuel. From an economic perspective, the United States and many nations around the world would clearly win.
But the U.S. government needs to weigh the clear benefits of a boost in global economic growth against three potential dangers: crippling American energy producers; reducing energy conservation efforts at home and abroad; destabilizing the Middle East by sharply reducing oil earnings in the region.
On the domestic energy front, lower oil prices would hurt the oil and gas-producing states of Alaska, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming by making it uneconomical to produce as much petroleum and to explore for some new supplies of petroleum.
We can expect that independent oil producers in the United States would argue for a tax on imported oil while leaving domestic production untaxed. This proposal has been raised frequently during the past 25 years and has been rejected by all sides of the economic and political spectrum. Basically, an import-only tax amounts to a subsidy of U.S. oil producers and results in premature depletion of our domestic oil reserves.
On the environmental front, one of the benefits of high energy prices is that they encourage energy conservation, resulting in less damage to the environment from fuel production and combustion. This happened during the 1980s, when energy prices were high. Just the opposite occurred during the 1990s when prices were relatively low.
If OPEC loses its power to set energy prices, energy use will almost surely increase absent other measures. This problem is especially important in view of the growing international consensus regarding the relationship between fossil fuel use and global climate change. As a result, lower oil prices might spark a renewed effort for across-the-board energy taxes to encourage reduced energy use and lower emissions of greenhouse gases.
As for the Middle East, most of OPEC's production is coming from nations bordering the Persian Gulf, which are currently pulling in about $500 million a day from oil exports. Some of these countries -- such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar -- have small populations and could prosper even with much lower oil prices. However, Saudi Arabia -- with a population of more than 23 million -- would sorely feel the loss in oil revenues because it is the dominant producer in OPEC. The combined impact of lower prices and reduced sales (at least in the short term) could devastate the Saudi economy and destabilize the government.
As we look at the real prospect of overthrowing Saddam, U.S. leaders need to keep in mind the profound effects their actions taken in the months ahead can have for decades to come on the world's governments, businesses and environment. America's challenge is to formulate an energy policy that promotes long-term political stability and economic growth while minimizing the negative effects of lower oil prices.
-James T. Bartis-
The choice the United States makes will have profound repercussions far into the future, because Iraq holds 112 billion barrels of proven reserves of crude oil -- more than five times the size of U.S. reserves.
For decades, the United States has appeared satisfied with the status quo of high oil prices more than $20 per barrel in today's dollars, rather than prices in the $8 to $12 per barrel range, which is where they would be today under a free market. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries drives oil prices artificially high by keeping the supply of oil artificially low.
U.N. sanctions against Iraq are a key factor in holding down worldwide oil production and keeping oil prices high. Because of the sanctions, Iraq produces fewer than 2.5 million barrels of oil a day -- far below what that country's huge oil resource base can sustain.
If Iraq is defeated in a war with the United States and allied nations, Iraq will need funds to rebuild. Oil exports are the obvious answer. Within 5 to 10 years, a combination of high pay-off investment and sound management could enable Iraq's oil fields to produce more than 10 million barrels of oil per day -- more than four times the current level.
Pumping millions of additional barrels of oil into the world market everyday would cause world oil prices to plummet. It is very unlikely that key OPEC members would agree to cut their own oil income by accepting significant cuts in their production. OPEC could plunge into a death spiral.
Under a free market, oil prices would probably fall to between $8 and $12 per barrel over the next 10 years -- down dramatically from today's price of about $25 per barrel. At current prices, the United States is sending about $90 billion per year to OPEC members and other oil exporting countries. Globally, about $350 billion per year moves from oil importers to oil exporters. With free-market oil prices, these huge transfers of wealth would drop by at least half and possibly as much as two-thirds.
A major decrease in petroleum prices would boost U.S. and global economic activity. Home heating oil prices would drop by at least a third. Gasoline prices would drop to less than $1 a gallon. As a result, people and business in the United States and throughout the world would spend far less for fuel. From an economic perspective, the United States and many nations around the world would clearly win.
But the U.S. government needs to weigh the clear benefits of a boost in global economic growth against three potential dangers: crippling American energy producers; reducing energy conservation efforts at home and abroad; destabilizing the Middle East by sharply reducing oil earnings in the region.
On the domestic energy front, lower oil prices would hurt the oil and gas-producing states of Alaska, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming by making it uneconomical to produce as much petroleum and to explore for some new supplies of petroleum.
We can expect that independent oil producers in the United States would argue for a tax on imported oil while leaving domestic production untaxed. This proposal has been raised frequently during the past 25 years and has been rejected by all sides of the economic and political spectrum. Basically, an import-only tax amounts to a subsidy of U.S. oil producers and results in premature depletion of our domestic oil reserves.
On the environmental front, one of the benefits of high energy prices is that they encourage energy conservation, resulting in less damage to the environment from fuel production and combustion. This happened during the 1980s, when energy prices were high. Just the opposite occurred during the 1990s when prices were relatively low.
If OPEC loses its power to set energy prices, energy use will almost surely increase absent other measures. This problem is especially important in view of the growing international consensus regarding the relationship between fossil fuel use and global climate change. As a result, lower oil prices might spark a renewed effort for across-the-board energy taxes to encourage reduced energy use and lower emissions of greenhouse gases.
As for the Middle East, most of OPEC's production is coming from nations bordering the Persian Gulf, which are currently pulling in about $500 million a day from oil exports. Some of these countries -- such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar -- have small populations and could prosper even with much lower oil prices. However, Saudi Arabia -- with a population of more than 23 million -- would sorely feel the loss in oil revenues because it is the dominant producer in OPEC. The combined impact of lower prices and reduced sales (at least in the short term) could devastate the Saudi economy and destabilize the government.
As we look at the real prospect of overthrowing Saddam, U.S. leaders need to keep in mind the profound effects their actions taken in the months ahead can have for decades to come on the world's governments, businesses and environment. America's challenge is to formulate an energy policy that promotes long-term political stability and economic growth while minimizing the negative effects of lower oil prices.
-James T. Bartis-
Seven ways to rebuild Iraq & hard-earned lessons on nation-building
In the wake of the war in Iraq, the world is learning once again that is far easier to destroy a regime with military might than to build a new state out of the bomb craters. We have tried before, and there is much to be learned from the successes and failures of nation-building in the past few decades - from Haiti to Kosovo and East Timor. No two situations are identical, but seven lessons stand out.
Lesson 1: It is imperative to establish a secure environment very fast. In Bosnia, we failed in the critical transfer of territories in Sarajevo. In Kosovo, the mandate for the troops was clearer, but we still failed to protect minorities. In both cases, we still suffer from the consequences of these initial failures.
In Afghanistan there are grave question marks over the consequences of limiting the international security presence to Kabul. As long as the gun remains the fastest way to power and property, there simply will not be room for democratic politics and entrepreneurship. With national police in disarray and international police always taking time to recruit, there is no alternative to using soldiers and armies to keep order.
Lesson 2: The central challenge is not reconstruction, but state-building. Reconstruction of the physical scars of war is certainly important, and it can be costly and take time. But building a political infrastructure that unites competing forces and ensures some sort of order, and an infrastructure of economic governance that promotes jobs and growth, is far more complex. Priorities must be right.
Lesson 3: To build a state, you need to know what state to build. Normally this requires some sort of a peace agreement or constitution. When this is not the case - as in Kosovo - any initial success risks being short-lived. In the Balkans, we have seen the immense challenge of doing so in a multiethnic environment. We must recognize that Iraq has some issues in common with other former parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Kosovo and the Kurdish region.
The potential of Iraq for disintegration is obvious, as are the consequences if this was to happen. Thus there has to be an early and fast agreement on a constitutional structure that will unite Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians of different beliefs in a state structure acceptable to them all.
Lesson 4: While humanitarian problems are always in the focus in the initial phase, it is dangerous to let them predominate over the long-term issues. There must be an early focus on economic questions such as currency, customs, taxation systems, commercial law, banking, debt restructuring and accessing international capital markets.
The sanctions that were provoked by Saddam Hussein have destroyed much of Iraq's economy. Because Iraq has experienced a population explosion, oil income per capita is unlikely to be substantially more than a tenth of what it was in the early 1980s. Job creation and bringing back a vibrant middle class are the keys to long-term stability.
Lesson 5: There has to be a benevolent regional environment. In the Balkans, regime change in Zagreb and Belgrade was key to improving prospects in Bosnia and Kosovo; in Afghanistan, the open or tacit cooperation of Pakistan and Iran is critical. If neighbors try to destabilize, they will sooner or later succeed.
Iraq is now a fragile zone in one of the most volatile areas of the world. Just about everyone recognizes that if the liberation of Iraq from tyranny is not followed by the liberation of Palestine from occupation - giving true security to Israel, too - the presence of U.S. and other NATO forces in Iraq will be an extremely challenging operation.
Lesson 6: The greater the international support, the easier the process. If there is international disagreement over the state-building process, this sooner or later risks translating into conflicts in the country in question. Some sort of UN framework normally helps, although it is not a guarantee. Building peace is a far more fragile, complex, costly and drawn-out process than fighting a war. So a peace coalition normally needs to be much broader than a war coalition.
Lesson 7: Nation-building takes a longer time, and requires more resources, than most initially believe. As the first High Representative in Bosnia, I was told that everything should be concluded within a year. When the folly of this was recognized, a new deadline of two years was given. But five years after that has expired, the fourth High Representative is hardly less busy than the first. Bosnia and Kosovo might be easy cases compared with Afghanistan and Iraq. Peace-building requires an abundance of patience.
Faced with the "mother of all nation-building," we must succeed. Failure will fracture Iraq, destabilize the region and affect the entire world. Once upon a time, Iraq was part of the Fertile Crescent. The coming years will determine whether this crescent now will be fertile for the forces of reform and representative government, or for the forces of resentment and revenge.
Lesson 1: It is imperative to establish a secure environment very fast. In Bosnia, we failed in the critical transfer of territories in Sarajevo. In Kosovo, the mandate for the troops was clearer, but we still failed to protect minorities. In both cases, we still suffer from the consequences of these initial failures.
In Afghanistan there are grave question marks over the consequences of limiting the international security presence to Kabul. As long as the gun remains the fastest way to power and property, there simply will not be room for democratic politics and entrepreneurship. With national police in disarray and international police always taking time to recruit, there is no alternative to using soldiers and armies to keep order.
Lesson 2: The central challenge is not reconstruction, but state-building. Reconstruction of the physical scars of war is certainly important, and it can be costly and take time. But building a political infrastructure that unites competing forces and ensures some sort of order, and an infrastructure of economic governance that promotes jobs and growth, is far more complex. Priorities must be right.
Lesson 3: To build a state, you need to know what state to build. Normally this requires some sort of a peace agreement or constitution. When this is not the case - as in Kosovo - any initial success risks being short-lived. In the Balkans, we have seen the immense challenge of doing so in a multiethnic environment. We must recognize that Iraq has some issues in common with other former parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Kosovo and the Kurdish region.
The potential of Iraq for disintegration is obvious, as are the consequences if this was to happen. Thus there has to be an early and fast agreement on a constitutional structure that will unite Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians of different beliefs in a state structure acceptable to them all.
Lesson 4: While humanitarian problems are always in the focus in the initial phase, it is dangerous to let them predominate over the long-term issues. There must be an early focus on economic questions such as currency, customs, taxation systems, commercial law, banking, debt restructuring and accessing international capital markets.
The sanctions that were provoked by Saddam Hussein have destroyed much of Iraq's economy. Because Iraq has experienced a population explosion, oil income per capita is unlikely to be substantially more than a tenth of what it was in the early 1980s. Job creation and bringing back a vibrant middle class are the keys to long-term stability.
Lesson 5: There has to be a benevolent regional environment. In the Balkans, regime change in Zagreb and Belgrade was key to improving prospects in Bosnia and Kosovo; in Afghanistan, the open or tacit cooperation of Pakistan and Iran is critical. If neighbors try to destabilize, they will sooner or later succeed.
Iraq is now a fragile zone in one of the most volatile areas of the world. Just about everyone recognizes that if the liberation of Iraq from tyranny is not followed by the liberation of Palestine from occupation - giving true security to Israel, too - the presence of U.S. and other NATO forces in Iraq will be an extremely challenging operation.
Lesson 6: The greater the international support, the easier the process. If there is international disagreement over the state-building process, this sooner or later risks translating into conflicts in the country in question. Some sort of UN framework normally helps, although it is not a guarantee. Building peace is a far more fragile, complex, costly and drawn-out process than fighting a war. So a peace coalition normally needs to be much broader than a war coalition.
Lesson 7: Nation-building takes a longer time, and requires more resources, than most initially believe. As the first High Representative in Bosnia, I was told that everything should be concluded within a year. When the folly of this was recognized, a new deadline of two years was given. But five years after that has expired, the fourth High Representative is hardly less busy than the first. Bosnia and Kosovo might be easy cases compared with Afghanistan and Iraq. Peace-building requires an abundance of patience.
Faced with the "mother of all nation-building," we must succeed. Failure will fracture Iraq, destabilize the region and affect the entire world. Once upon a time, Iraq was part of the Fertile Crescent. The coming years will determine whether this crescent now will be fertile for the forces of reform and representative government, or for the forces of resentment and revenge.
The Folly of Nation-Building in Afghanistan
Gary Dempsey, a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, is a co-author of Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building.
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), recently claimed that an American-led nation-building effort in Central and South Asia is the long-term solution to the terrorism problem. For Biden, this nation-building effort should focus on changing the economic and social climate of Afghanistan and its neighbors, and include something akin to the Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Besides setting an awkward precedent -- that harboring terrorists will eventually bring new roads and heaps of foreign aid -- Biden's nation-building recommendation overlooks the obvious: Postwar Afghanistan will look nothing like postwar Germany, or for that matter, postwar Japan.
For starters, the high level of education and industrial know-how in postwar Germany and Japan helped launch an economic recovery in both countries that is inconceivable almost anywhere else. Germany also had a strong tradition of the rule of law, property rights, and free trade before the Nazi era. Japan's elite embraced an honorific culture that respected and obeyed the wishes of the victor in battle. Afghanistan and its neighbors, in contrast, have little in the way of either liberal traditions or cultural attitudes that are agreeable to massive foreign interference.
What's more, the leaders of Germany and Japan were not just utterly defeated in war. Their ideology was totally discredited in the eyes of their own people by war's end. This made both countries prime candidates for nation building. It's premature to assume the same pattern will hold for the leaders of the Taliban. Radical Islam could remain dominant, and its defenders could be seen as national heroes or martyrs.
Another probable difference: Even before World War II ended, the Germans and Japanese had become amenable to Washington's policy prescriptions. In fact, according to University of Illinois political scientist Richard Merritt, by the time the war ended, substantial numbers of Germans "were disgusted by what the Nazis had done and increasingly realized that Nazi actions were not accidental but were consistent with and even prefigured by Nazi ideology. . . . To some measure, then, the American Military Government enjoyed a ready market for its product." By the end of the war the Japanese, too, had become receptive to profound political change in ways not replicated since.
There's little evidence the United States will enjoy a "ready market" for its product in Afghanistan. History, in fact, points in the opposite direction. The Afghans did not attack Moscow's puppet regime in Kabul and fight a war with Soviet invaders in the 1980s because they wanted democracy, liberalism, and free markets. They did it because they opposed forces trying to secularize and modernize their country; i.e., nation build. This presents a major problem for those who would equate nation building in Afghanistan with nation building in postwar Germany or Japan.
Or take Biden's idea of a Marshall Plan. It is telling that one has to go back more than 50 years to find an example of such a scheme that worked. Similar plans since then have routinely failed. Indeed, since World War II the United States alone has provided $1 trillion in foreign aid to countries around the world. The result? According to the United Nations, 70 of the countries that received aid are poorer today than they were in 1980, and an incredible 43 are worse off than in 1970. Good intentions must be matched by an effective, non-corrupt administration on the receiving end.
The failures are not so surprising if one studies the Marshall Plan experience in detail. If massive government spending could work anywhere, it was in 1948 Europe: Skilled labor was largely available, the rule of law and property rights had a long history, and the customs of a commercial society were recoverable. All it needed was physical capital. But even under those circumstances, there is no real evidence that the Marshall Plan alone was responsible for Europe's regeneration. U.S. assistance never exceeded 5 percent of the GDP of any recipient nation, and there seemed to be an inverse relationship between economic aid and economic recovery. In fact, France, Germany, and Italy all began to grow before the onset of the Marshall Plan, and Great Britain, the largest recipient of aid, performed the most poorly.
The real lesson of the Marshall Plan is that the rule of law, property rights, free markets, and an entrepreneurial culture are what are necessary for economic success. Afghanistan has none of these things. And well-meaning senators in Washington can't make it otherwise.
Source: CATO Institute
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), recently claimed that an American-led nation-building effort in Central and South Asia is the long-term solution to the terrorism problem. For Biden, this nation-building effort should focus on changing the economic and social climate of Afghanistan and its neighbors, and include something akin to the Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Besides setting an awkward precedent -- that harboring terrorists will eventually bring new roads and heaps of foreign aid -- Biden's nation-building recommendation overlooks the obvious: Postwar Afghanistan will look nothing like postwar Germany, or for that matter, postwar Japan.
For starters, the high level of education and industrial know-how in postwar Germany and Japan helped launch an economic recovery in both countries that is inconceivable almost anywhere else. Germany also had a strong tradition of the rule of law, property rights, and free trade before the Nazi era. Japan's elite embraced an honorific culture that respected and obeyed the wishes of the victor in battle. Afghanistan and its neighbors, in contrast, have little in the way of either liberal traditions or cultural attitudes that are agreeable to massive foreign interference.
What's more, the leaders of Germany and Japan were not just utterly defeated in war. Their ideology was totally discredited in the eyes of their own people by war's end. This made both countries prime candidates for nation building. It's premature to assume the same pattern will hold for the leaders of the Taliban. Radical Islam could remain dominant, and its defenders could be seen as national heroes or martyrs.
Another probable difference: Even before World War II ended, the Germans and Japanese had become amenable to Washington's policy prescriptions. In fact, according to University of Illinois political scientist Richard Merritt, by the time the war ended, substantial numbers of Germans "were disgusted by what the Nazis had done and increasingly realized that Nazi actions were not accidental but were consistent with and even prefigured by Nazi ideology. . . . To some measure, then, the American Military Government enjoyed a ready market for its product." By the end of the war the Japanese, too, had become receptive to profound political change in ways not replicated since.
There's little evidence the United States will enjoy a "ready market" for its product in Afghanistan. History, in fact, points in the opposite direction. The Afghans did not attack Moscow's puppet regime in Kabul and fight a war with Soviet invaders in the 1980s because they wanted democracy, liberalism, and free markets. They did it because they opposed forces trying to secularize and modernize their country; i.e., nation build. This presents a major problem for those who would equate nation building in Afghanistan with nation building in postwar Germany or Japan.
Or take Biden's idea of a Marshall Plan. It is telling that one has to go back more than 50 years to find an example of such a scheme that worked. Similar plans since then have routinely failed. Indeed, since World War II the United States alone has provided $1 trillion in foreign aid to countries around the world. The result? According to the United Nations, 70 of the countries that received aid are poorer today than they were in 1980, and an incredible 43 are worse off than in 1970. Good intentions must be matched by an effective, non-corrupt administration on the receiving end.
The failures are not so surprising if one studies the Marshall Plan experience in detail. If massive government spending could work anywhere, it was in 1948 Europe: Skilled labor was largely available, the rule of law and property rights had a long history, and the customs of a commercial society were recoverable. All it needed was physical capital. But even under those circumstances, there is no real evidence that the Marshall Plan alone was responsible for Europe's regeneration. U.S. assistance never exceeded 5 percent of the GDP of any recipient nation, and there seemed to be an inverse relationship between economic aid and economic recovery. In fact, France, Germany, and Italy all began to grow before the onset of the Marshall Plan, and Great Britain, the largest recipient of aid, performed the most poorly.
The real lesson of the Marshall Plan is that the rule of law, property rights, free markets, and an entrepreneurial culture are what are necessary for economic success. Afghanistan has none of these things. And well-meaning senators in Washington can't make it otherwise.
Source: CATO Institute
Thursday, May 25, 2006
USA Homeland Security
President Bush's Top Priority Is The Safety And Security Of The American People. Since September 11th, President Bush has restructured and reformed the Federal government to focus resources on counterterrorism and to ensure the security of our homeland.
The Administration Has Worked With Congress To Implement The 9/11 Commission's Recommendations. Since the Commission issued its final report, the Administration has taken action on 37 of the Commission's 39 recommendations that apply to the Executive Branch and is working with Congress to continue to improve intelligence and homeland security.
Administration Officials Repeatedly Have Testified On The Implementation Of The Recommendations. Officials from the Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other agencies have testified before Congress on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in over 50 hearings since the Commission issued its final report.
The President Supported The Work Of The Commission. The White House provided the 9/11 Commission with unprecedented access, including providing close to 1,000 interviews with Administration officials and making available 2.3 million pages of documents for the Commission's review.
Key Institutional Developments And Accomplishments
Appointing The Director Of National Intelligence. President Bush signed into law the landmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which overhauls the intelligence community, mandating a range of reforms and centralizing in one office key authorities. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as President Bush's principal intelligence advisor and the leader of the Intelligence Community. The first DNI, Ambassador John Negroponte, was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in this past April.
Establishing The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC assists in analyzing and integrating foreign and domestic intelligence acquired from all U.S. government departments and agencies pertaining to the war on terrorism. The Center identifies, coordinates, and prioritizes the counterterrorism intelligence requirements of America's intelligence agencies and develops strategic operational plans for implementation. In July 2005, the Senate confirmed the President's nominee, Vice Admiral Scott Redd, to become the first Director of the NCTC.
Establishing The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The DNDO, in the Department of Homeland Security, provides a single federal organization to develop and deploy a nuclear-detection system to thwart the importation of illegal nuclear or radiological materials.
Appointing A Privacy And Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The President has nominated the Chairman and Vice Chairman and appointed the other three members to serve on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, to further help ensure that privacy and civil rights are not eroded as we fight the War on Terror.
Establishing The Terrorist Screening Center. In order to consolidate terrorist watch lists and provide around-the-clock operational support for Federal and other government law-enforcement personnel across the country and around the world, the Administration created the Terrorist Screening Center. The Center ensures that government investigators, screeners, and agents are working with the same unified, comprehensive set of information about terrorists.
Transforming The FBI To Focus On Preventing Terrorism. The President has led the effort to transform the FBI into an agency focused on preventing terrorist attacks through intelligence collection and other key efforts, while improving its ability to perform its traditional role as a world-class law-enforcement agency.
Strengthening Transportation Security Through Screening And Prevention. Since 9/11 the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made significant advancements in aviation security, including the installation of hardened cockpit doors, a substantial increase in the number of Federal Air Marshals, the training and authorization of thousands of pilots to carry firearms in the cockpit, the 100 percent screening of all passengers and baggage, and the stationing of explosives-detection canine teams at each of the Nation's largest. These initiatives have raised the bar in aviation security and shifted the threat.
Improving Border Screening And Security Through The US-VISIT Entry-Exit System. US-VISIT uses cutting-edge biometric technology to help ensure that our borders remain open to legitimate travelers but closed to terrorists. US-VISIT is in place at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 50 land border crossings across the country. Since January 2004, more than 39 million visitors have been checked through US-VISIT.
Establishing The National Targeting Center (NTC) To Screen All Imported Cargo. DHS established the NTC to examine cargo and passengers destined for the United States to identify those presenting the greatest threat. The NTC screens data on 100 percent of inbound shipping containers (9 million per year) to identify those posing a "high risk." CBP personnel examine 100 percent of high-risk containers.
Expanding Shipping Security Through The Container Security Initiative (CSI). The CSI is currently established in over 35 major international seaports to pre-screen shipping containers for illicit or dangerous materials before they are loaded on vessels bound for the United States.
Developing Project Bioshield To Increase Preparedness For A Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Or Nuclear Attack. Project BioShield is a comprehensive effort that will ensure that resources ($5.6 billion) are available to pay for "next-generation" medical countermeasures, expedite the conduct of NIH research and development on medical countermeasures based on the most promising recent scientific discoveries, and give FDA the ability to make promising treatments quickly available in emergency situations. Project BioShield will help protect Americans against a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack.
Cracking Down On Terrorist Financing With Our International Partners. Over 400 individuals and entities have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224, resulting in nearly $150 million in frozen assets and millions more blocked in transit or seized at borders. We have built an international coalition that is applying more rigorous financial standards and controls to help prevent terrorists' use of the international financial system. Specifically, we have established with the Government of Saudi Arabia a Joint Task Force on Terrorism Finance that serves as a coordinating mechanism to cooperate on important terrorism-financing investigations.
Increasing Cooperation And Reform Among International Partners At The Front Lines Of The War On Terror. In Pakistan over the next five years, we will provide more than $3 billion in security, economic, and development assistance to enhance counterterrorism capacity and promote continued reform, including of the education system. In the last three years, the United States provided more than $4.5 billion in reconstruction, economic, and security assistance programs to Afghanistan.
The Whitehouse (Press Office)
The Administration Has Worked With Congress To Implement The 9/11 Commission's Recommendations. Since the Commission issued its final report, the Administration has taken action on 37 of the Commission's 39 recommendations that apply to the Executive Branch and is working with Congress to continue to improve intelligence and homeland security.
Administration Officials Repeatedly Have Testified On The Implementation Of The Recommendations. Officials from the Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other agencies have testified before Congress on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in over 50 hearings since the Commission issued its final report.
The President Supported The Work Of The Commission. The White House provided the 9/11 Commission with unprecedented access, including providing close to 1,000 interviews with Administration officials and making available 2.3 million pages of documents for the Commission's review.
Key Institutional Developments And Accomplishments
Appointing The Director Of National Intelligence. President Bush signed into law the landmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which overhauls the intelligence community, mandating a range of reforms and centralizing in one office key authorities. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as President Bush's principal intelligence advisor and the leader of the Intelligence Community. The first DNI, Ambassador John Negroponte, was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in this past April.
Establishing The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC assists in analyzing and integrating foreign and domestic intelligence acquired from all U.S. government departments and agencies pertaining to the war on terrorism. The Center identifies, coordinates, and prioritizes the counterterrorism intelligence requirements of America's intelligence agencies and develops strategic operational plans for implementation. In July 2005, the Senate confirmed the President's nominee, Vice Admiral Scott Redd, to become the first Director of the NCTC.
Establishing The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The DNDO, in the Department of Homeland Security, provides a single federal organization to develop and deploy a nuclear-detection system to thwart the importation of illegal nuclear or radiological materials.
Appointing A Privacy And Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The President has nominated the Chairman and Vice Chairman and appointed the other three members to serve on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, to further help ensure that privacy and civil rights are not eroded as we fight the War on Terror.
Establishing The Terrorist Screening Center. In order to consolidate terrorist watch lists and provide around-the-clock operational support for Federal and other government law-enforcement personnel across the country and around the world, the Administration created the Terrorist Screening Center. The Center ensures that government investigators, screeners, and agents are working with the same unified, comprehensive set of information about terrorists.
Transforming The FBI To Focus On Preventing Terrorism. The President has led the effort to transform the FBI into an agency focused on preventing terrorist attacks through intelligence collection and other key efforts, while improving its ability to perform its traditional role as a world-class law-enforcement agency.
Strengthening Transportation Security Through Screening And Prevention. Since 9/11 the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made significant advancements in aviation security, including the installation of hardened cockpit doors, a substantial increase in the number of Federal Air Marshals, the training and authorization of thousands of pilots to carry firearms in the cockpit, the 100 percent screening of all passengers and baggage, and the stationing of explosives-detection canine teams at each of the Nation's largest. These initiatives have raised the bar in aviation security and shifted the threat.
Improving Border Screening And Security Through The US-VISIT Entry-Exit System. US-VISIT uses cutting-edge biometric technology to help ensure that our borders remain open to legitimate travelers but closed to terrorists. US-VISIT is in place at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 50 land border crossings across the country. Since January 2004, more than 39 million visitors have been checked through US-VISIT.
Establishing The National Targeting Center (NTC) To Screen All Imported Cargo. DHS established the NTC to examine cargo and passengers destined for the United States to identify those presenting the greatest threat. The NTC screens data on 100 percent of inbound shipping containers (9 million per year) to identify those posing a "high risk." CBP personnel examine 100 percent of high-risk containers.
Expanding Shipping Security Through The Container Security Initiative (CSI). The CSI is currently established in over 35 major international seaports to pre-screen shipping containers for illicit or dangerous materials before they are loaded on vessels bound for the United States.
Developing Project Bioshield To Increase Preparedness For A Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Or Nuclear Attack. Project BioShield is a comprehensive effort that will ensure that resources ($5.6 billion) are available to pay for "next-generation" medical countermeasures, expedite the conduct of NIH research and development on medical countermeasures based on the most promising recent scientific discoveries, and give FDA the ability to make promising treatments quickly available in emergency situations. Project BioShield will help protect Americans against a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack.
Cracking Down On Terrorist Financing With Our International Partners. Over 400 individuals and entities have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224, resulting in nearly $150 million in frozen assets and millions more blocked in transit or seized at borders. We have built an international coalition that is applying more rigorous financial standards and controls to help prevent terrorists' use of the international financial system. Specifically, we have established with the Government of Saudi Arabia a Joint Task Force on Terrorism Finance that serves as a coordinating mechanism to cooperate on important terrorism-financing investigations.
Increasing Cooperation And Reform Among International Partners At The Front Lines Of The War On Terror. In Pakistan over the next five years, we will provide more than $3 billion in security, economic, and development assistance to enhance counterterrorism capacity and promote continued reform, including of the education system. In the last three years, the United States provided more than $4.5 billion in reconstruction, economic, and security assistance programs to Afghanistan.
The Whitehouse (Press Office)
NORAD - USA & Canada, working for the defence of North America
The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is a bi-national military organization which has acted as a pillar of Canadian-American defence of the North American continent since its inception in 1958. NORAD serves as the first line of defence against air and aerospace attacks on our homelands, and has now been expanded to include maritime warning.
In renewing the Agreement, Canada and the US have enhanced defence cooperation by increasing NORAD's capacity to assist in addressing emerging security challenges, such as maritime threats.
This Agreement supports the Government's "Canada First" commitment to protect Canadians and defend national security and sovereignty.
Background
The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is a bi-national military organization formally established in 1958 by Canada and the United States to monitor and defend North American airspace. NORAD monitors and tracks man-made objects in space and detects, validates and warns of attack against North America by aircraft, missiles or ‘space vehicles’ (e.g. satellites and space debris). NORAD also provides surveillance and control of Canadian and U.S. airspace.
The NORAD Agreement was first signed by the governments of Canada and the United States on May 12, 1958, and has been renewed for varying periods since that time. Although there have been nine NORAD renewals since 1958, the basic text of the Agreement has been revised substantially only four times – in 1975, 1981, 1996 and now, in 2006.
The Commander of NORAD is appointed by, and is responsible to, both the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. Traditionally, the Commander of NORAD is American, and the Deputy Commander, Canadian. NORAD Headquarters is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado. NORAD’s warning and control missions are exercised through the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, located a short distance away.
Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship
Canada and the U.S. enjoy one of the most extensive and long-standing defence relationships in the world. The tradition of bilateral cooperation in the defence of North America dates back to the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement and is a natural complement to the extensive political, economic, cultural and social ties that link our two countries.
Canada derives significant benefits from this relationship. Canada-U.S. defence cooperation has provided us with:
- enhanced protection from direct military attack;
- insight into U.S. thinking on security matters, and influence over U.S. decisions where Canadian interests are involved;
- valuable training and operational experience that helps not only in the defence of North America, but also in UN, NATO, and other multinational operations abroad;
- preferential access to U.S. test facilities, which, along with research and development opportunities, have helped develop many technologies used by the Canadian Forces; and
- defence development, production, and sharing agreements that stimulate Canada's research and development community and help support some 50,000 Canadian aerospace and defence jobs nation-wide.
Canada-U.S. Cooperation: Responding to the New Threat Environment
The Government of Canada has the fundamental responsibility to protect Canada and Canadians in an increasingly complex and uncertain environment. The past decade has seen significant and cumulative changes to the international security landscape, such as the emergence of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Given the increasingly complex nature of the new threat environment, exploring ways to strengthen defence and security arrangements with the U.S., including an enhanced role for NORAD, is in Canada's security interest.
In response to the events of September 11, 2001, and recognizing the potential cross-border impact of emerging security threats, Canada and the U.S. pursued a range of measures to enhance continental security cooperation, both at home and abroad. As part of its response, the U.S. established U.S. Northern Command, mandated to protect U.S. sovereignty, territory, the domestic population and critical defence infrastructure against external threats and aggression. In Canada, initiatives such as the creation of Canada Command, responsible for Canada and its air and marine approaches as a single operational theatre, have been designed to place a greater emphasis on the defence of Canada and North America. In addition, recent budgets have also announced measures to enhance the security of Canadians.
Data Provided by Canadian Forces
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